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Key Points
• The securitisation of drug policy discourse in the Russian Federation since 2003 has played 
an important role in the both the relative internal realignment of prominent ‘power min-
istries’ within the Russian government, and in the attempted conceptualisation of a new 
‘national ideology’ since 2012.
•	 The	development	of	the	‘drug	discourse’	in	Russia	post-Communism	can	be	classified	in	
approximately three phases: a health and psychiatric-dominated discourse up until ap-
proximately 2003, an increasingly prevalent securitisation discourse after 2007, and today 
a conservative cultural discourse.
•	 Russia	has	utilized	the	general	drug	war	discourse	to	both	increase	the	levers	of	influence	
available to it on the international arena, and to press for greater convergence and har-
monisation of drug policies within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
• The imminent departure of NATO from Afghanistan has led to further reform of Russia’s at-
tempted outreach to other states within the framework of the ‘war on drugs’; the Russian 
model of ‘alternative development’ via ‘rapid industrialization’ is now explicitly held up 
as both more productive, and of greater utility, than Western-sponsored crop substitution 
schemes.
• Russia in toto has implemented a relatively complex set of policies that appear set to 
present an explicit alternative agenda to proposals favouring greater harm reduction or 
decriminalisation at the next UNGASS summit in 2016.
* Senior lecturer, Department of History and member of the Scottish Centre for War Studies, University of Glasgow
2‘It is evident that it is impossible to move forward without spiritual, cultural and national 
self-determination. […] We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually 
rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western 
civilisation. They are denying moral principles and all traditional identities: national, 
cultural, religious and even sexual. They are implementing policies that equate large 
families with same-sex partnerships, belief in God with belief in Satan. And people are 
aggressively trying to export this model all over the world.
I am convinced that this opens a direct path to degradation and primitivism, resulting in a 
profound demographic and moral crisis.’
    President Putin addressing the Valdai club, September 20132
‘The drugs trade has become a global challenge to the entire international community, and 
for some countries has become a national tragedy. The drugs trade is a breeding ground 
for organised crime, smuggling, and illegal migration. Even sadder and more dangerous, it 
is	also	a	breeding	ground	for	terrorism.	We	therefore	believe	it	essential	to	fight	all	types	
of drugs, and we are worried by the more ‘relaxed laws’ that some countries have passed, 
and that lead to legalisation of so-called ‘soft’ drugs. This is a very dangerous path! It is 
extremely important to support and strengthen the current international legal framework 
in this area, which rests above all on the three basic UN conventions.’
President Putin addressing delegates at the International Drug Enforcement Conference, 20133
 
The case of Russia presents a dramatic 
example of the ‘unintended consequences’ 
of implementing the current UN drug control 
regime within the international system. This 
system, created by three successive UN drug 
law conventions observed by all UN member 
states since 1961, is itself the product of 
periodic review by the UN General Assembly 
Special Session (UNGASS). The next major 
UNGASS meeting of UN member states in 
2016	 appears	 destined	 to	 see	 major	 conflict	
within the existing drug control system, or in 
other words a growing ‘fractured consensus’, 
as some countries pursue ever more radical 
forms of decriminalisation of consumption or 
legalisation of production. It will also however 
highlight the potentially more prominent 
role of Russia as a conservative global actor 
on the drug control issue. In 2008, reviewing 
the ‘UNGASS decade’ that marked the ten 
years since the 1998 UN declaration calling 
for	 intensified	 international	 cooperation	
against	illicit	drugs	in	the	field	of	both	supply	
and	 demand	 reduction,	 prominent	 figures	
within	 the	 United	 Nations	 Office	 on	 Drugs	
and Crime (UNODC) had already begun to list 
five	 ‘unintended	 consequences’	 (UCs)	 of	 the	
current global drug prohibition and control 
regime created by the three main (1961, 1971, 
1988)	 UN	 drug	 conventions.	 These	 five	 UCs,	
which were then repeated verbatim in many 
subsequent reports and publications, were:
• The creation of criminal black markets;
• Policy displacement (the propensity of a 
law-enforcement approach to crowd out 
the public-health dimension of counter-
narcotics);
• Geographical displacement, otherwise 
known as the ‘balloon effect’
3• Substance displacement, whereby 
consumers move from one drug to another 
depending	on	fluctuations	in	availability	
and price; and
• The social exclusion and marginalisation of 
drug users.4
Each of these alleged unintended consequenc-
es merits problematising and questioning on 
its own terms. As Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy has 
recently argued, the creation of a criminal 
black market arguably fails any discrimi-
nating test of ‘unintended’ consequences, 
being a consequence that arises inevitably 
from prohibition itself, rather than from a 
specific	policy	 intervention.5  The causes and 
occurrence mechanisms behind each of these 
alleged ‘unintended consequences’, which are 
themselves frequently entirely unmeasured, 
remains amongst the most underdeveloped 
parts of the existing global drug policy 
literature, even amongst those who use the 
framework as a proxy argument for decrimi-
nalisation and regulation.6 In addition however, 
there is no need to regard the UNODC’s own 
list of ‘unintended consequences’ as either ex-
haustive or comprehensive7, particularly since 
it also largely excludes the insights that can 
potentially be gained from both international 
relations theory and political economy.8  The 
extent to which the drug control system since 
1961 has been used indirectly as a means of 
international	pressure	and	influence,	 in	ways	
that	 go	beyond	mere	 attempts	 at	 intensified	
law enforcement, has, as a general research 
topic, usually only been applied to relations 
between the US, Mexico, and Latin America, 
where	 the	 US	 de-certification	 process	 has	
historically also been accompanied by trade 
boycotts, the cutting off of non-related 
economic aid, public censure, and other 
sanctions.9 However since at least 2003, if not 
indeed before, the ‘securitisation’ of the illic-
it drug debate in the Russian Federation, with 
its accompanying ‘new moralism’, has fed 
directly into both a reshaping of the Russian 
domestic narrative around national identity, 
and into a progressively more activist Russian 
foreign policy towards both Central Asia and 
Latin	 America.	 This	 briefing	 paper	 seeks	 to	
examine Russia’s own evolving position within 
the context of an increasingly ‘fractured con-
sensus’ around the interpretation and imple-
mentation of the existing UN conventions. The 
2010 ‘Rainbow-2’ plan announced by Russia for 
eradicating opium production in Afghanistan, 
justified	by	framing	this	as	a	threat	not	just	to	
the state, but to ‘global peace and security’, 
in particular marked a recent sharp escalation 
in the securitisation of drugs as an existential 
threat	at	the	international	level,	via	a	specific	
‘speech act’.10  Prior to the Ukraine crisis in 
2014, Russia also placed rollback of what it 
perceived as the threatening ‘liberalisation’ 
of the international narcotics control regime 
as one of the central agenda points in its 
upcoming G8 presidency.11  This same process, 
however, has also fuelled a growing ‘culture 
war’ between the Russian Federation and the 
EU, due to an EU drugs policy that continues 
to emphasise both interdiction and harm re-
duction (the latter being aimed, amongst oth-
er things, at reducing the prevalent infection 
rate of HIV/AIDS, and to this end incorporating 
opioid substitution treatment (OST), needle 
exchange programmes, and in some countries 
safe injection rooms).12   The growing rift with 
EU trends in particular appears destined to 
figure	 significantly	 in	 the	 now	 increasingly	
fractured consensus over the future direction 
of global drug policy that the 2016 UNGASS 
summit will undoubtedly reveal.13
The current Russian attitude to the ‘drug 
threat’ as a domestic security issue, one 
that then overlaps with wider issues of 
international security and foreign policy, has 
itself emerged against a historical backdrop 
that is more complex than is commonly 
appreciated. Historically, based on the Soviet 
experience, explosions in domestic drug use 
are inextricably connected in the Russian 
national consciousness with wider periods 
4of societal breakdown, political stagnation, 
and the collapse of pre-existing values. This 
phenomenon was most recently visible during 
the period of the Soviet collapse. Indeed, if 
in 1989, across the whole of the USSR, there 
were	officially	 recorded	 some	131,000	 ‘drug	
users’, then by 1997 across the Russian 
Federation alone, between 2.5 to 6 million 
citizens were estimated to be regularly using 
illegal drugs.14 This increase is no doubt due, 
in no small part, to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union’s own highly policed frontiers, and 
the corresponding increasing integration of 
Russia	into	global	trade	flows,	of	which	heroin	
via the ‘northern route’ from Afghanistan has 
become a major one.15  However as we shall 
see, in Russian governmental discourse this 
has also become associated with a perceived 
threat of ‘moral decline’, to a collapse in 
social solidarity fostered by the end of the 
Soviet Union, and to the growing perceived 
threat of contamination from the West’s 
‘genderless and infertile’ liberal values. The 
drug discourse in Russia has thus become 
fascinatingly intertwined with a conscious 
effort by the government itself to generate 
a new national ideology, one that embodies 
what	 President	 Putin	 by	 2013	 had	 defined	
as the true values of a ‘very conservative 
country.’16  For the purposes of this policy 
brief, the start of this latest shift will be 
approximately dated to the appointment of 
Vladimir Medinskii in May 2012 to head the 
Russian Ministry of Culture. Medinskii, a noted 
anti-Communist perhaps most famous to 
date for proclaiming that the time has come 
to close the mausoleum on Red Square and 
bury Lenin, has been associated with a more 
general conservative turn in recent Russian 
cultural politics, one which has also seen 
President Putin himself make increasingly 
conservative and explicitly anti-Communist 
remarks (certainly when compared to his 
first	term).	The	rejection	of	Communism	and	
socialism as a ‘wrong path’ has in turn also 
led to the promotion of more ‘traditional’ 
Russian conservative religious values, such 
as those associated with the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century Russian philosophers 
Ivan Il’in and Vladimir Berdiaev.
 Prior to this most recent evolution however, the 
development of the securitised drug discourse 
in Russia, with its most recent interweaving 
with wider narratives of threatened national 
decline and the corresponding need for moral-
based rejuvenation, is also framed through the 
experience of how Russians have historically 
experienced ‘drug epidemics’ in the past. The 
last similar ‘drug epidemic’ to that which 
occurred post-1991 took place during the 
collapse of the Tsarist Empire and emergence 
of the early Soviet regime.17  Prior to 1917, 
drug use in the Russian Empire had been best 
known as a widespread social phenomenon 
only in Primor’e oblast in the Russian Far East 
and in Tsarist Central Asia, where both opium 
and hashish use were relatively widespread. 
Following the Russian Civil War of 1917–21 
however, Soviet clinics in European Russia 
during the early 1920s reported an epidemic 
of drug use amongst the underage orphans left 
destitute	 by	 the	 conflict,	 with	 cocaine	 use-
whether snorted, smoked, or administered 
orally-reportedly a particular problem. During 
the interwar years, Soviet laws prohibiting 
drugs then began to be re-centralised, 
culminating in both tighter border controls, 
and by 1934 this had led to a union-wide ban on 
the cultivation of opium and ‘Indian cannabis 
[konopli]’ for anything except medical use.18 
 
Treatment for drug addiction in the Soviet 
Union between the 1920s and 1950s was 
meanwhile remarkably mixed, with individual 
clinics experimenting with both ‘abrupt’ 
and ‘gradual’ withdrawal strategies towards 
addicts, and even (in the case of World War 
Two veterans who had become addicted to 
morphine), with maintenance treatment.19 
By the 1960s however, as concerns over 
domestic drug use began to rise again, Soviet 
narcology rapidly assumed a more monolithic 
aspect, one dominated by the psychiatric 
5profession, and embodied in the 1965 text on 
addiction treatment of Eduard Babaian [often 
transliterated as Babayan], whose professional 
views	 on	 this	 subject	 remained	 influential	
well into the 1990s, and who also headed the 
Russian delegation to the UN Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs (CND) between 1964 and 1993.20 
During this period in general, the problem of 
perceived drug addiction was again growing-
if,	 according	 to	 the	 official	 statistics	 of	 the	
Soviet Ministry of Health, there were 23, 714 
drug addicts in 1965, then by the end of 1971 
there	were	already	more	than	50,000	officially	
recorded cases undergoing treatment. Though 
still not on the scale of the problem occurring 
in the contemporary United States at the time, 
this	phenomenon	was	sufficiently	alarming	as	
to attract renewed medical and legislative 
attention. This backdrop framed the 
introduction what many have characterized 
as	the	Soviet	Union’s	first	true	‘drug	law’,	the	
1974 law on ‘strengthening the struggle with 
drug addiction’.21
 
When	 it	 came	 to	 evolving	 a	 unified	 Soviet	
approach towards addiction treatment, 
Babaian in 1964 meanwhile advocated a 
symptom-based three step approach, based 
upon	 initial	 total	 abstinence,	 detoxification,	
and	finally	psychological	 reinforcement,	with	
the	 first	 two	 stages	 implemented	 within	
a specialist medical clinic. Treatments to 
relieve withdrawal symptoms during stage two 
included a daily injection of insulin, followed 
by glucose, retinol, and a range of vitamins. 
Another Soviet text from 1973 endorsed 
electrotherapy in cases of extreme withdrawal, 
whilst also making the argument that ‘[we] do 
not have amongst us the social roots either for 
alcoholism or other forms of drug addiction 
[narkomaniia]. Drug addiction is deeply 
foreign to the socialist order. In our conditions 
it	 is	evidence	of	 the	 insufficient	culture	of	a	
person, their hooliganism [raspushchennosti], 
or the result of bad education, bad examples, 
and customs acquired from the past...’22 
Repeat offenders who continued to abuse 
drugs or alcohol under this system risked being 
committed to special work camps known as LTPs 
(lechebno-trudovye profilaktorii) for between 
six months to two years, where they would 
undergo ‘re-education through labour’.23  Core 
to the approach adopted by Soviet psychiatry 
towards drug and alcohol addiction in general 
during this period was the legacy of Ivan Pavlov 
and	the	notion	of	‘conditioned	reflexes’.	This	
approach legitimised both hypnosis therapy 
[kodirovanie], and measuring dependence 
based	 upon	 the	 exhibition	 of	 specific	 visible	
symptoms (for example in using the absence of 
the	vomit	reflex	as	a	diagnosis	of	alcoholism).24 
As late as 2002, reviews of addiction treatment 
in the Russian Federation acknowledged the 
long shadow still cast by such older views, with 
an ongoing tendency to diagnose addiction 
by exhibited symptoms.25 Therefore, whilst 
acknowledgement of the importance of social 
conditions always formed a part of Soviet and 
later Russian assessments of effective therapy 
and treatment of drug addiction, textbooks 
themselves continued to focus predominantly 
on	 medical	 means	 of	 detoxification.	 The	
practice of measuring apparent effectiveness 
based purely on observation of the physical 
symptoms meanwhile frequently lead to 
premature release from treatment, and to 
high remission rates amongst addicts.
This background left the post-Soviet space 
peculiarly vulnerable to a ‘drug epidemic’, 
since the wider social conditions, generally 
taken for granted, which ameliorated the 
shortcomings	 of	 Soviet-style	 detoxification	
treatment prior to 1991-conditions such 
as family support networks, guaranteed 
employment, and secure territorial frontiers 
reducing the actual quantity and variety of 
illicit drugs available-underwent radical decay 
during the Yeltsin years. At the same time 
the severe shortcomings of Soviet forms of 
addiction treatment as they had evolved after 
1964, including the absence of Western-style 
social services or rehabilitation therapy, and 
the criminalisation and stigmatization of drug 
6addicts themselves, with associated increased 
mortality rates and threats of epidemic 
disease, came into sharp focus during the 
1990s and 2000s, as drug use within the 
Russian Federation exploded.26  Stigmatisation, 
lack of needle exchange programmes, an 
ongoing ban on opioid substitution treatment, 
a cultural proclivity for injecting rather 
than smoking heroin, and the poor record of 
existing programmes in actually breaking the 
cycle of drug use, have contributed indirectly, 
for example, to the fact that 80 percent of 
the people infected with HIV/AIDS in the 
Russian Federation are intravenous drug users. 
According to Russian academics working in 
the Institute for Demography, Migration and 
Regional Development, the lowering in street 
price of Afghan heroin to $5 for a single dose 
also produced two clear spikes in Russian 
heroin addiction rates, in 1997–98 and 2003–
04 respectively, generating a heroin addicted 
community conservatively estimated at 2.5 
million today.27 This process has also fostered 
what is unquestionably a general ‘health crisis’ 
on a demographic scale, with heroin-related 
Russian mortality rates currently thought to 
run at about 30, 000 deaths a year, higher than 
the comparable annual Soviet death toll from 
military action in 1980s Afghanistan.
The securitisation of drug discourse in Russia 
in response to this growing social crisis 
can in general be dated back to two main 
events, namely President Putin’s ‘speech 
act’ designating drugs a national security 
threat on September 4th 2002, wherein he 
proclaimed the existing situation a ‘calamity’, 
and demanded ‘new proposals that will lead 
to	 a	 significant	 change	 in	 the	 fight	 against	
drugs’, and secondly, the emergence of new 
national security agencies charged with 
tackling the problem, most notably the 
Federal Service for the Control of the Drugs 
Trade (FSKN) established in 2003, and the 
State Anti-Narcotics Committee (GAK) set 
up in 2007.28  The FSKN quickly rose in the 
ranks to become, by 2006, one of the twelve 
official	‘power	ministries’	within	the	Russian	
state, a situation for which there is no direct 
Soviet or Tsarist precedent. The reason for 
its rapid elevation undoubtedly relates both 
to internal bureaucratic politics, and to the 
success the organisation has so far enjoyed 
in	 carving	 out	 a	 fiefdom	 as	 a	 separate	 tool	
of	 influence	 and	 control	 within	 the	 CIS.29 At 
the international level meanwhile, Russia’s 
growing prioritisation of the issue as both a 
national security threat, and as an ongoing 
lever of regional and even international 
influence	when	 used	 to	 rigidly	 interpret	 the	
existing UN conventions was symbolised by 
ongoing efforts to retain or appoint Russians 
to prominent posts in the UNODC and to the 
thirteen-member International Narcotics 
Control Board (INCB).30 Eduard Babaian, 
founding father of the 1960s school of Soviet 
narcology, and long-time delegate to the UN 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs, became a 
member of the INCB in 1995, was made vice-
president in 2003, and following his death 
in 2005 (at the age of 85) was effectively 
replaced by former Russian Health Minister 
Professor Tatiana Dmitrieva, who herself was 
already a prominent opponent of methadone-
based addiction treatment within the Russian 
context.31  Significant	 donations	 to	 the	
UNODC’s general-purpose (voluntary) funds, 
including a $7 million donation in 2010, also 
accompanied the appointment of a prominent 
Russian diplomat, Yurii Fedotov, to head the 
UNODC in 2010.
The	 first	 step	 in	 the	 securitisation	 process	
of the drug problem in the Russian domestic 
context was meanwhile the perceived need 
to	 develop	 a	 specifically	 sovereign	 Russian	
approach to the problem. Whilst the Soviet 
legacy initially continued to cast a long 
shadow here, and can still be felt in Russian 
opposition to methadone, harm reduction 
programmes, or any talk of decriminalisation, 
the classifying of the ‘drug threat’ as a national 
security issue has also seen the Russian state 
agencies concerned undertake a rethink of 
7what strategy they do wish to endorse and 
enact, particularly as the status quo looked 
increasingly unsustainable. Russian drug policy 
has, therefore, been more adaptive than it is 
sometimes given credit for, even whilst that 
adaptation has also been shaped by an ever 
more strident desire to articulate this evolving 
policy	 in	 terms	 of,	 firstly,	 a	 securitisation	
discourse, and latterly within a discourse of 
conservative social values and the upholding 
of national sovereignty (becoming increasingly 
defined,	in	short,	by	an	‘othering’	of	the	drug	
problem, the natural by-product perhaps of 
what	President	Putin	in	September	2013	defined	
as Russia’s essential goal of establishing a fully 
sovereign ‘state –civilization’ as a model of 
national development)32
Reconsideration of the existing legal regime 
in Russia arguably began in 2003–04, when the 
Russian government effectively decriminalised 
possession of small amounts of drugs. Prior 
to this law being enacted, between 1996 
and 2004, ‘drug tables’ drawn up by Babaian 
himself had established the right to legally 
imprison	somebody	for	between	five	to	seven	
years for possession of as little as 0.005 of a 
gram of heroin (regardless of purity). Such 
classifications	 were	 arrived	 at	 in	 order	 to	
simplify prosecutions for the purchase or sale 
of illegal drugs on a ‘large scale’. In 1997, 
‘large scale’ constituted 0.1 gram of opium or 
any amount of heroin; only in 1998, in fact, 
had the bar for heroin been lowered to 0.005 
of a gram. These grades were arrived at not 
based upon the quantity necessary for a single 
dose, but upon the drugs’ perceived ‘social 
dangerousness’.33 The 2003 amendments to the 
Criminal	Code	redefined	prosecution	as	valid	if	
the accused possessed ‘large’ or ‘exceptionally 
large’ quantities of drugs, where ‘large’ for 
example was set at in excess of ten average 
minimum doses. The minimum average dose 
was initially set at 0.0001 gram, before in 2004 
finally	being	reclassified	to	the	(more	realistic)	
0.1 of a gram. This policy was intended to 
facilitate a shift towards prosecuting dealers 
rather than users.34 Resistance from within 
the FSKN and amongst other Russian lobby 
groups to these proposed changes forced 
a repeal of the law in 2006 however, in the 
process	restoring	the	definition	of	‘large’	and	
‘especially large’ to being an absolute amount, 
rather than a multiple of single doses. Under 
these amendments, a ‘large’ amount was 
reclassified	 as	 0.5	 gram-still	 a	 more	 liberal	
regime than that pertaining in 1996, when this 
had been set at 0.1 of a gram, but a retreat 
from	the	2004	amendment	which	had	defined	a	
‘large quantity’ as 1 gram. Under the leadership 
of	its	first	director,	Viktor	Cherkesov,	the	focus	
of the FSKN during these years also remained 
strongly punitive in intent-Cherkesov himself 
continued to oppose methadone treatment for 
addicts, as well as any talk of the legalisation 
of ‘soft’ drugs.35 Russian drug law as a result 
of these cumulative changes nonetheless 
ironically liberalised its position earlier 
than, for example, Poland, a European Union 
member state (since 2004) where possession 
of any quantity of illicit drugs up until 2011 
nonetheless still remained strictly illegal-
resulting in about 30,000 arrests a year, and 
a 1, 648 percent increase in prosecutions 
for possession between 1999 and 2007.36 In 
2010 however, further evidence also began 
to emerge of an ongoing rethink of Russia’s 
own demand-reduction strategies in relation 
to addiction, fuelled both by the anarchic 
diversity of existing strategies, and by the 
publication	 of	 an	 official	 ‘Strategy	 of	 state	
anti-narcotics policy of the Russian Federation 
out to 2020.’
Whilst the overarching state attitude to illicit 
drug use and drug addiction in the Russian 
Federation remains strongly punitive and 
repressive	 in	 orientation,	 under	 an	 official	
umbrella of zero tolerance, there has in 
fact also emerged a substantial diversity of 
addiction treatment therapies at the non-
state level (church, civil society and NGO 
groups),	filling	the	vacuum	left	by	the	obvious	
shortcomings	of	state-sponsored	detoxification	
8programmes, even as state health care itself 
has also become more decentralised (See Box 
1). This position was partially also driven by 
the fact that, up until 2011, Russia remained 
eligible for Global Fund grants to combat HIV/
AIDS; this fund disbursed $38, 400, 000 between 
2002 and 2010 on programmes targeting 
people who inject drugs.37  Up until 2010 the 
Russian government’s own attitude to these 
programmes was relatively laissez faire, akin, 
if anything, to Chairman Mao’s policy of ‘let 
a	 hundred	 flowers	 bloom’,	 though	 advocates	
of harm reduction continued to experience 
harassment, and OST treatment remained 
banned. Non-state supported treatments 
accordingly still range from those that would 
be normal in many West European countries, 
such as needle exchange programmes in Kazan, 
to church programmes that rely on little more 
than isolation in remote rural regions and 
collective prayer, to programmes such as that 
followed by Evgenii Roizman’s foundation ‘City 
without Drugs’, based upon abstinence, the 
use of physical constraints (chaining addicts to 
beds), and physical punishment. In June 2012 
the death of an addict undergoing treatment 
at one of Roizman’s centres in Sverdlovsk 
oblast led to the centre being closed, and a 
police investigation. However, the scandal 
appears not to have harmed Roizman’s growing 
popularity	and	political	profile,	since	 in	2013	
he won the post of mayor in Ekaterinburg, 
becoming	one	of	the	members	of	the	‘official	
opposition’ to Putin’s United Russia party.38 
 
Despite	 a	 diversification	 of	 measures	 to	
treat addiction, one of the biggest gaps in 
existing capacity remains at the level of 
social rehabilitation; state efforts to create 
rehabilitation centres only began in 2000, 
and in 2006 they still only existed in 26 
regions.39 Most strikingly, this fact was also 
acknowledged in 2011 by the current serving 
head of the FSKN, Viktor Ivanov, as the area 
where most change needed to occur. In 
connection with a new law of 23 August 2011 
allowing state support to non-commercial 
organisations engaged in drug rehabilitation, 
Ivanov publicly recognized catastrophically 
high existing remission rates amongst addicts 
undergoing treatment, as a result of which 
‘existing models of treatment are simply not 
Diagram 1. Ivanov’s proposed ‘Scheme of organizing work with drug users’ from 2011, 
incorporating	14	day	detoxification,	2	months	psychological	support,	and	up	to	a	year	of	
rehabilitation leading to ‘re-socialization’
9attaining their goals’, and under which the 
existing assumption of releasing addicts on the 
principle	that	‘on	Monday,	after	detoxification,	
I will begin a new life’ was clearly grossly 
inadequate.	 What	 Ivanov	 identified	 was	 the	
need to instead offer a fundamentally new set 
of surroundings and social support networks-a 
rehabilitation programme in the full sense of 
the word, lasting up to a year (see diagram 
1)-which would entail the ‘organization of a 
national system of rehabilitation as a whole’.40 
The rolling out of a more centralised and 
state-wide drug rehabilitation programme, 
if Ivanov’s scheme is realised, therefore 
represents both a further evolution of Russian 
drug policy, and an ever more urgent search 
for better answers that will at the same time 
also	 fit	 a	 wider	 narrative	 over	 both	 Russian	
identity and sovereignty in general, and the 
permissible limits of drug reform in particular. 
This scheme at another level may therefore 
also be perceived as Russia’s homegrown 
answer to the European agenda of ‘harm 
reduction’, which appears destined to cause 
increased friction at UNGASS in 2016.
As models to follow for Russia’s new 
rehabilitation programme, Ivanov drew 
from observations made of the ‘Haymarket’ 
rehabilitation centre in Chicago, kibbutzim 
in Israel, work communes for drug addicts in 
Italy, and existing centres in St. Petersburg, 
Siberia, and the North Caucasus, whilst also 
underlining his view that the eradication of 
the old Soviet system of work camps (LTPs),41  
however	 flawed,	 given	 that	 it	 had	 occurred	
‘without [creating an adequate alternative’, 
represented a fundamental mistake. This 
in short was to be a reform of existing 
drug treatment, but one that retained a 
traditional	Russian	flavour-drawing	upon	both	
best practice (from the Russian perspective) 
elsewhere, but also, for example, on the 
memory of Soviet educationalist A. S. 
Makarenko. The latter’s programmes in 
the 1920s for rehabilitating child-criminals 
psychologically damaged in the Russian 
Civil War had worked on the principle of 
making the individual answerable to the 
collective.42 The FSKN’s appropriation of the 
rehabilitation programme at the same time 
also to a certain degree marked its internal 
institutional ascendancy over the Russian 
Ministry of Health; the fact that Ivanov 
simultaneously chairs both the FSKN and the 
State Anti-Narcotics Committee (GAK) has in 
this context arguably been critical in moving 
the drugs debate from a Soviet-era public 
health	 and	 psychiatric-dominated	 field	 to	
a securitised discourse. In November 2012 
President Putin ordered the formal creation 
of a state programme for the rehabilitation 
of drug addicts, a programme projected to 
involve expenditure of 179 billion roubles 
(nearly US $5.5 billion) and due to unroll over 
2013–20, but disagreements over funding 
have to date nonetheless delayed its full 
implementation down to the present. Russian 
critics of the programme meanwhile continue 
to point to ongoing shortcomings over lack 
of guaranteed anonymity for participants, 
or	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 official	 authorities	 to	
identify	 or	 discriminate	 between	 first	 time,	
experimental drug users and long-term 
addiction or problematic drug use.43  At the 
same time, in November 2013 President 
Putin nonetheless also signed into effect a 
law, tellingly developed by the FSKN, which 
for	 the	 first	 time	 allowed	 Russian	 courts	 to	
sentence drug addicts to compulsory addiction 
treatment,	with	financial	penalties	of	around	
5,000 roubles or 30 days incarceration for 
non-compliance. 44  At the same time, the 
securitisation of the drug discourse that 
intensified	 after	 2003	 was	 already	 taking,	
by 2010, an ever clearer external direction 
as well; the increasing foregrounding of the 
‘war on drugs’ as a keystone of Russian foreign 
policy	in	the	near	abroad,	in	the	first	place	in	
regard to Central Asia and Afghanistan.
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Box 1. View from the Ground: Russian domestic drug policy
Interview with Anya Sarang, Andrei Rylkov Foundation, Moscow*
The situation with regard to drug use in Russia has changed dramatically in the past few years. 
As Sarang notes ‘It seems to me that compared with the 1990s open access to illicit drugs 
such as heroin has reduced – in the 1990s access was as free as you please…you want heroin, 
you want khanka [Russian slang: a home-made opium derivative, normally injected], go ahead 
– compared to this the situation has completely changed... it’s become more closed and 
less accessible, and also that people have started using synthetic drugs and pharmaceutical 
substitutes, for example last year we had a string of cases of people using prescription drugs 
without prescription, and we had a three year epidemic of krokodil [the street name for 
desomorphine]….’
Within this shifting market there remains, however, a lack of appropriate rehabilitation 
centres and access to harm reduction interventions: ‘The most harmful consequences are 
in the areas of health, in particular the high mortality rates amongst people, of which a 
significant part is the high prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS, all of this would be avoidable if 
we had a harm reduction programme, according to UNAIDS we have half a million with HIV/
AIDS infections but this estimate is already five years old, right now a minimum of 2 million 
people are living with this disease, and frequently a condition for them receiving treatment 
is that they abstain from drug use, which they can’t do due to the absence of rehabilitation 
programs or substitution treatment, so the mortality rate here is high’. 
Moreover, as Sarang points out, ‘A huge number of these people end up in prison, 70% 
of people in prison are drug users, and there the combination of tuberculosis and drug 
addiction means that a prison term is practically a death sentence. The courts don’t think 
about this, and might say this person will sit in jail two years and then will be free, but in 
fact they’re sentencing them to death, if this person already has AIDS and then acquires 
tuberculosis in jail they will almost definitely die. We started a project three years ago 
looking at the prevalence of tuberculosis in Russia. The tuberculosis in jails is untreatable 
and the tuberculosis treatment centres in the regions are simply morgues. The consequences 
are therefore in actual fact catastrophic, but they’re also completely invisible to wider 
society as a whole.’
*President of the Andrei Rylkov Foundation for the past 11 years, Anya Sarang has focused on 
developing and supporting the emerging harm reduction movement in Russia through various 
training and networking activities. 
A full transcript of the interview is available here  blog.swansea.ac.uk/gdpo/?p=307
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RUSSIA AND AFGHANISTAN: 
OPERATIONALISING THE NEW SECURITY 
PARADIGM IN RUSSIA’S ‘NEAR ABROAD.’
For the Russian Federation, the state of 
highest concern in the international arena 
from the drug securitisation perspective has 
for some considerable time been Afghanistan. 
Illicit drug crop production in Afghanistan 
(predominantly opium, but including cannabis, 
of which today Afghanistan is allegedly the 
largest	 global	 supplier)	 assumed	 a	 significant	
(but unmeasured) scale in the 1980s during 
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, before 
coming more and more to international 
attention in the 1990s, and then coming to 
dominate discussion at the international level 
since	 2001.	To	 a	 significant	 degree	 the	 scale	
of opium cultivation in Afghanistan has grown 
in concentration even as it has shrunk (in 
relative terms) in geographical scope across 
the country since 2001 (with 15 provinces 
declared ‘poppy free’ today, compared to 
just four reportedly poppy-free provinces 
in 2003).45  Controversially, the period of 
the biggest boom in Afghan domestic opium 
production, by some considerable margin, has 
occurred during the period of most recent 
and intense international involvement in the 
country.	 Though	 UNODC	 figures	 still	 remain	
only estimates, by even the most conservative 
interpretation Afghan illicit opium production 
has undergone historically unprecedented 
growth since 2001, reaching an estimated 
peak of 8,200 metric tonnes in 2007, before 
suffering a collapse in 2010 down to 3, 600 
tonnes	due	to	crop	blight	affecting	field	yields	
and a spike in world food prices, amongst other 
factors.46 Cultivation since then however has 
also shown some evidence of rebounding as 
market prices rose four fold (with the acreage 
devoted to cultivation increasing 18 percent 
between 2011 and 2012), despite redoubled 
eradication efforts in 2012. Bad weather and 
disease led the estimated overall 2012 Afghan 
opium harvest to still be lower than that of 
2011, but farm gate opium prices remained 
relatively high, continuing to provide an 
incentive for farmers to grow. Concentration 
of production meanwhile continued, with 
90 percent of opium production in 2013 
estimated to have occurred in just nine Afghan 
provinces. The most recent estimate on the 
scale of the Afghan opium crop cultivation 
has seen dramatic estimated increases in both 
cultivation (up by 36 percent) and production. 
209,000 hectares were reportedly devoted to 
poppy cultivation in 2013, higher than in even 
2007,	though	still	with	a	lower	final	production	
figure,	 possibly	 due	 to	 a	 combination	 of	
weather and ecological constraints – for 2013 
there was an estimated 5,500 tonne harvest. 
This in turn has led to speculation that the 
illicit economy in general will rebound as 
economic uncertainty in the licit sector 
increases during the international withdrawal 
in 2014. Casualties incurred by Afghan police 
and	 Counter-Narcotics	 Ministry	 officials	
associated with attempted interdiction and 
crop eradication efforts have meanwhile also 
seen a sharp rise in the past three years.47 
The	division	of	effort	with	regard	to	trafficking	
of illicit drugs from Afghanistan meanwhile 
remains disputed in the existing literature, 
and	 reflects	 the	 high	 degree	 of	 art	 involved	
in reaching approximations about regional 
trafficking	patterns	(see	Map	1).	 In	2003,	the	
UN estimated that 65 percent of Afghan opiates 
passed through Central Asia and on into Russia, 
but this was subsequently radically revised 
downwards to 15 percent, before then being 
revised up again in 2010 to 25 percent. The 
Iranian route by contrast is held in the latest 
relevant UNODC report to account for 35 
percent	of	the	heroin	traffic,	and	Pakistan	for	
the remaining 40 percent.48	Trafficking	through	
Turkmenistan appears to feed the ‘Balkan 
route’ via Turkey, rather than the Russian 
‘Northern	Route’.	Trafficking	in	general	is	also	
considered to be the area where the greatest 
profits	are	made;	the	UNODC	in	2008	estimated	
that	Afghan	heroin	traffickers	accrued	about	79	
percent	of	total	profits	in	the	industry,	whilst	
farmers by contrast garnered 21 percent.49 
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The Northern Route itself has of course 
then also fed a blossoming drug addiction 
problem in both Central Asia and the Russian 
Federation itself. In 2010 Central Asian users 
were calculated to use as much as one third 
per capita of heroin as Russian users, with an 
estimated 280, 000 heroin users in Central 
Asia.50 The Central Asian states mainly appear 
to remain transit countries however, with 
local consumption highly concentrated and 
apparently supported from tapping into 
overflows	 from	 the	 trafficking	 process	 itself	
– it being now often accepted that global 
heroin supply regularly exceeds demand 
in most regional markets, with all the 
associated questions that then arise around 
potential stockpiling and product dumping.51 
Russia itself has by contrast predominantly 
evolved into a site of heroin consumption, 
with relatively little spill-over into the rest of 
Eastern Europe.52 Even accepting the lower-
end	official	government	estimate	of	some	2.5	
million Russian heroin addicts, the UNODC in 
2009 estimated that Russia the previous year 
accounted for 21 percent (70 tons of ‘pure’ 
heroin) of global heroin consumption, as 
against a European market share (Europe being 
here taken to exclude both Russia and Turkey) 
of 26 percent (87 tons) of ‘pure’ heroin.53 By 
this estimate, Russia comes second only to 
Europe in terms of global heroin consumption, 
with the per capita ratio of addicts in Russia 
being even higher than in Europe, and with 
Russia, when considered on a state-to-state 
basis,	 coming	 first	 in	 the	 world	 in	 terms	 of	
total heroin consumption.
Map	1.		Heroin	Trafficking	from	Afghanistan	to	the	Russian	Federation	and	to	Europe54  
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In order to facilitate combating this security 
threat,	 Russia	 firstly	 became	 a	 leading	
participant in the Paris Pact initiative founded 
in May 2003, whose Rainbow Strategy aims at 
‘a regional solution to an Afghan challenge’, via 
coordinating the anti-narcotics activities of 
the regional countries most affected by Afghan 
drug	 trafficking.	 In	 the	 process	 of	 surveying	
drug trends in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central 
Asia, the Paris Pact also produced a short report 
on illicit drug trends in the Russian Federation 
itself.55	 However	 perhaps	 the	 largest	 official	
initial successes in the Paris Pact’s ‘Rainbow 
Strategy’ were ‘Operation Transhipment’ and 
‘Operation Tarcet’, successive coordinated 
enforcement operations mounted jointly by 
Russia, the Central Asian states and Pakistan, 
which between 2006 and 2009 targeted the 
traffic	in	chemical	precursors	(including	acetic	
anhydride) necessary for heroin production 
(such substances were added to the list of 
controlled substances under the third UN 
convention of 1988). Such an initiative was 
far from pointless, since in 2008 alone, 12,000 
tons of these chemical precursors were 
estimated	to	be	required	to	be	trafficked	into	
Afghanistan in order to process the 66 percent 
of the opium harvest which was thought to be 
refined	in-country.56 These efforts contributed 
to an overall 250 percent increase in acetic 
hydride seizures in 2008, with a particularly 
large increase in such seizures also occurring in 
Slovenia and Hungary, and cumulatively appear 
to have had some market impact. The price 
for acetic anhydride in Afghanistan reached 
$300–400 a litre in 2009 (licit purchases of 
acetic anhydride costs less than $1 per litre) 
compared to $65 a litre locally in 2005, or 
$13–34	a	litre	in	1998,	suggesting	a	significant	
degree of recent supply disruption. In 2009, the 
UNODC also estimated that only two thirds of 
Afghanistan’s	opiate	exports	were	now	refined	
as opposed to raw opium, down from three 
quarters a few years before.57 This operation 
however was conducted without review as to 
whether the effort could be sustained or was 
regionally coherent, with China, a notable non-
participant in the programme, being an obvious 
potential alternative supplier of chemical 
precursors. That same year an increase in 
reported	 trafficking	 of	 chemical	 precursors	
into Afghanistan was again being reported, 
organised via both new routes and the co-
option of legal commerce and ‘grey’ markets.58 
Difficulties in targeting trafficking in 
general meanwhile have been increased 
by the completion in 2010 of a major free 
trade agreement between Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan, as part of Russia’s ‘Eurasian 
Customs Union’ project. Kazakhstan 
remains the main hub of trafficking routes 
into Russia itself, a position reflected 
by the establishment there of the 
UNODC-affiliated Central Asia Regional 
Information Coordination Centre (CARICC) 
for coordinating anti-trafficking efforts in 
Central Asia. The new customs agreement 
aims at dramatically lowering trade costs in 
general, and abolishes both visa requirements 
and customs posts within the territory of the 
customs union, meaning that goods (licit, 
and by proxy of course illicit) can now be 
traded within the borders of the union along 
any road or rail route, rather than by pre-
designated pathways. This situation has then 
been further complicated by the increasingly 
efficient logistic networks (rails and ports) 
that emerged as a result of the Northern 
Distribution Network (NDN), constructed 
in Central Asia to help supply NATO forces 
in Afghanistan-the latter designed to avoid 
over-dependence on access routes via 
Pakistan, an acknowledged existing strategic 
vulnerability. These technical developments, 
combined with new political agreements, 
have led to a steadily increasing volume of 
trade in general between Afghanistan and 
its northern neighbours, increasing illicit 
trafficking opportunities, and leading many 
to fear that increasing volumes of trade are 
now outpacing the capacity of local security 
organs to mount and maintain effective 
surveillance.59
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Despite the apparent success of regional 
cooperation in targeting chemical precursor 
trafficking,	 the	 limited	overall	effect	of	such	
efforts, particularly taking into account the 
increasingly strong countervailing trends 
noted above, also meant that the Russian 
Federation remained during this same time 
period deeply discontent with the measures 
undertaken within Afghanistan itself to 
curb opium production. The declaration 
in 2009 by US special envoy to Afghanistan 
Richard Holbrooke that the US would no 
longer pursue poppy eradication, due to its 
counter-productive economic consequences 
– a declaration intended to mark a shift 
towards	 tackling	mid-to-high	 level	 traffickers	
and Afghan drug laboratories s instead – led 
in	 particular	 to	 a	 high-profile	 clash	 between	
Holbrooke and head of the Russian FSKN 
Viktor Ivanov.60 The alternative seven point 
‘Rainbow-2’ plan proposed in 2010 by Russia for 
Afghanistan (see diagram 2) involved extensive 
crop eradication activity via aerial fumigation 
(a	 proposal	 in	 fact	 first	 explored	 by	 the	 U.S.	
authorities in 2004), together with economic 
aid for alternative development. 
Diagram 2 – Rainbow 2
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Russia in fact proposed this plan to be the 
basis of a joint Russian-EU effort for a common 
Eurasian anti-narcotics strategy, with Ivanov, 
allied with Italian MEP (and former head 
of the UNODC) Pino Arlacchi, suggesting 
‘Rainbow-2’ be consolidated with the EU’s 
own 2010 strategy paper, ‘A New Strategy for 
Afghanistan’.61 Such was Ivanov’s discontent 
at the lack of support this proposal in practice 
received from both Kabul and EU member 
states however, that on the 28th November 
2013 he suggested that the ‘Rainbow-2’ 
plan be re-submitted to NATO countries by 
the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO).62 Since aerial crop 
eradication was and remains rejected by 
Russia’s potential partners, however, Russia 
since 2011 has also re-emphasized the second 
main component of the plan, namely the need 
for greater economic development to tackle 
the drug industry in Afghanistan. The Russian 
pressure for more ‘alternative development’, 
which they emphasize as requiring complete 
national development rather than temporary 
and unsustainable local crop substitution, has 
also been accompanied by a strengthening in 
bilateral Russian-Afghan trade. Writing off, in 
2007, more than $11 billion of Afghanistan’s 
Soviet-era debt, the Russian government 
has more recently undertaken projects to 
reconstruct and get working again large 
quantities of Soviet-era infrastructure in 
Afghanistan, amongst them a prefabricated 
house factory and the Jabul-Saraj cement 
plant. Russian proposals of ‘security through 
development’ have come in general to 
emphasize ‘accelerated industrialization’ as 
their own ‘alternative development’ plan for 
Afghanistan, with a 2014 study emphasizing 
prioritisation to construction of a chain of 
hydroelectric power stations on the river 
Panj, an electrified railway connecting 
Tajikistan through Afghanistan with Pakistan, 
a major chemical manufacturing facility, and 
a ‘dry port’ at the Afghan-Pakistan border-
an investment package totalling $17.5 billion 
for realisation of its first stage.63 At the same 
time, both the CSTO in general, and Russia 
in particular, have explicitly ruled out being 
drawn into security operations in Afghanistan 
post-2014.64 Russia has instead focused ever 
more intently on converting the CSTO into 
an effective anti-trafficking alliance, a step 
that implies the full-scale ‘militarization’ of 
Russian drug policy in its ‘near abroad’. The 
Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS in 
both 1996 and 2006 paved the way for this 
effort by adopting two model laws on drugs, 
which were then officially disseminated 
as the template upon which CIS member 
states should model their own national 
legislation.65 Pressure to unify legislation via 
this route within the CIS-in practice leading 
to a toughening of drug laws in some member 
states-appears to have been a regular 
feature of CIS and CSTO meetings ever 
since, with the rhetoric of ‘narcoaggression’ 
and the ‘war on drugs’ regularly used in 
internal policy documents on the subject. 
Against this backdrop, individual Central 
Asian states continue to pursue and support 
harm reduction programmes, including OST 
programmes that remain banned in Russia 
itself; however Kazakhstan has toughened its 
drug laws in recent years in line with Russia’s 
own harmonisation objectives. In this same 
spirit Viktor Ivanov in November 2013, 
increasingly dismissive of the possibility of 
collaboration with the EU, also underlined 
during a CSTO meeting in Minsk (which 
coincided with an EU ‘Eastern Partnership’ 
meeting in Vilnius) the CSTO’s role as ‘the 
main, and in essence, only guarantee of anti-
narcotic security in Eurasia.’66
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RUSSIA, “RAINBOW-3” AND LATIN 
AMERICA: OPERATIONALISING THE 
NEW SECURITY PARADIGM AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL.
The growing concerns expressed by Russian 
security	 officials	 over	 the	 perceived	
weakening of the international drug control 
regime in general, combined perhaps with 
a desire to expand operations and raise its 
profile	in	America’s	own	geopolitical	backyard,	
found	 reflection	 in	 2010	 when	 head	 of	 the	
FSKN	 Viktor	 Ivanov	 undertook	 a	 high	 profile	
trip to California to condemn proposals 
being advanced there for the legalisation of 
marijuana.67 In 2012, however, the real core of 
Russia’s new agenda with regard to advancing 
its own perspective in the evolving ‘fractured 
consensus’ in global drug strategy was fully 
unveiled during Ivanov’s visit to Central 
America, meeting foreign ministers, policemen 
and policymakers in Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, 
El	 Salvador,	 Panama	 and	 Brazil	 on	 an	 official	
mission to increase transnational cooperation 
against	 drug	 trafficking.	 Given	 the	 low	 level	
of penetration of Latin American cocaine into 
the Russian drugs market, Ivanov’s visit must 
in fact be seen within the context of the ‘third 
wave’ of Russia’s own securitisation discourse 
in the ‘war on drugs’; the ‘Rainbow-3’ 
initiative formally unveiled that same year 
to coordinate a ‘global alliance’ to combat 
drug	 trafficking	 and	 promote	 alternative	
development.68 ‘Rainbow-3’ was orientated 
around nothing less than attempting to 
forge	 a	 unified	 approach	 towards	 targeting	
the ‘planetary centres’ of drug production, 
namely Latin America and Afghanistan, with 
Ivanov emphasising to his foreign counterparts 
the superiority of the Russian approach of 
focusing on unemployment and poverty over 
North American methods.69 To his Mexican 
counterparts, Ivanov for example expanded 
on ‘Rainbow 3’ as a ‘complex and balanced 
approach’, allowing both the construction of 
new industrial capacity and infrastructure, 
and generating an alternative to increasingly 
prevalent but irresponsible proposals for 
the decriminalisation or legalisation of all 
drugs.70 Prior to its ejection from the G8 in 
2014, Russia made clear its intent to place 
the	 issue	 of	 fighting	 the	 ‘planetary	 drug	
threat’ at the core of its own upcoming 
presidency of that organisation. This Russian 
proposal,	 with	 accompanying	 high	 profile	
trips to Latin America, therefore undoubtedly 
reflected	both	a	more	general	Russian	desire	
to intensify its contacts and relationships 
with Latin America, and more particularly a 
further Russian effort at ‘rollback’ against any 
threatening liberalisation of the ‘war on drugs’, 
particularly given the reforms in domestic drug 
policy being advanced or already undertaken 
by Latin American states like Uruguay and 
Guatemala. This process was itself however 
after 2012 already being overtaken by a 
‘cultural’ discourse which merged the domestic 
and internationalised securitisation discourses 
into	yet	a	further,	specifically	Russian	form-the	
‘drug war’ as a symptom of the wider ‘culture 
war’; a discourse that the Putin administration 
in its third term began to utilise more and 
more often in an effort to frame a new draft 
of Russian national identity. 
CONCLUSION: RUSSIA, GLOBAL DRUG 
POLICY, AND THE UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES OF POLICY 
DISPLACEMENT
A review of the evolution of Russian drug policy 
reveals two striking overarching phenomena, 
both of which can be considered ‘unintended 
consequences’ of the current drug control 
regime. First, Russian drug policy in terms of 
both form and content has been less monolithic 
than it is often portrayed, despite becoming 
increasingly monopolised by a major power 
ministry since 2003. Prior to the 1960s, Soviet 
drug treatment policy was if anything rather 
pluralistic in its approach, whilst within Russia 
today advocates of harm reduction measures 
remain	 active,	 albeit	 often	 in	 difficult	
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circumstances. The moves taken by the state 
itself after 2003 to legalise possession of small 
quantities of drugs, and the more recent 
moves to roll out a nationwide system of state 
sponsored drug rehabilitation centres, reveal 
a framework that, within the parameters of its 
own particular paradigm, continues to adapt. 
However, the often unspoken but persistent 
need to create just such a ‘national paradigm’ 
– of edges and boundaries to the frame – 
remains the greatest unintended consequence 
of the drug control system itself, in Russia just 
as much as elsewhere. The implementation 
of a drug control regime in Russia, as in 
other countries, has in reality therefore been 
marked less by the dry implementation of 
laws, and more by a wider ongoing debate over 
what constitutes the ‘good society’, and what 
moral order the state is seeking to establish 
and defend. This has led, in the recent past, 
to both the USSR and Russia adopting stricter 
measures of control over drug prohibition and 
treatment than the UN conventions themselves 
require. Contrary to the probable intent of 
those who designed and constructed the three 
UN conventions, this therefore remains an 
ongoing and evolving process, which bleeds 
out into wider debates over the relative 
balance between individual human rights and 
the public good in every society. 
At least in the Russian case, the (often 
neglected) cause of such displacement 
also	 inevitably	 reflects	 upon	 the	 ongoing	
attempted development of a coherent 
‘national ideology’ since the Soviet collapse, 
just as much as (perhaps even more) it does 
the	relative	budgetary	profile	and	institutional	
heft of the main power ministries concerned. 
In Russia the securitisation of the drug issue 
since 2003 has therefore certainly had a 
very strong policy displacement effect, with 
police, intelligence cooperation, and even 
military action continuing to be frequently 
given greater priority than a health-care based 
approach. Most notably, individual health care 
treatments such as OST remain banned, with 
one consequence of the most recent Russian 
annexation of the Crimea being, for example, 
the ending of provision of methadone to the 
more than 800 patients previously receiving 
such treatment there.71 Since 2012 however 
the securitisation discourse has itself become 
overshadowed by an ever more prevalent 
‘cultural discourse’ around deviant behaviour 
in	general,	reflected	with	increasing	frequency	
in the public statements of President Putin, 
and in the rising role and pronouncements of 
the Russian Ministry of Culture under Vladimir 
Medinskii. The very fact that the perceived 
need to develop a truly sovereign drug policy 
model has grown so dramatically within the 
context of a fracturing consensus has therefore 
clearly also fed into the wider debate of what 
Russia herself as a ‘state-civilization’ should 
stand for.72 After 2012 one can argue that 
the securitisation discourse that has evolved 
within Russia since 2003 has therefore actually 
been increasingly suborned to a third, yet more 
general discourse over cultural contamination 
by foreign liberal values. This year has for 
example seen leaked reports on the Russian 
Ministry of Culture’s planning document on 
the ‘Base of State Cultural Policy’, whose 
foundation stone is reportedly that ‘Russia is 
not Europe’, and which will designate ‘alien 
values’ as to blame for ‘increased crime, 
alcoholism, drug addiction [emphasis added] 
and a rise in suicides.’73 In short, the policy 
displacement generated by the manner 
that the Russian government has chosen to 
implement the drug control regime has now 
bled	 out	 significantly	 into	 a	 wider	 national	
narrative, one condemning ‘multiculturalism’ 
and decadent moral equivalence, and one 
that now sits to some extent already outside 
and beyond debate and discussion over drug 
control itself. 
This observation informs assessment of 
the second clearly visible observation one 
can make about the policy displacement 
effect, namely the increasing incorporation 
by Russia of its drug control views into 
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a more activist foreign policy in general, 
whether through visits to Latin America, 
more intense work within the CSTO, or 
promises of greater economic support and 
‘alternative development’ to Afghanistan – 
where the outgoing President Karzai has, in 
return, recently quickly moved to recognize 
Russian annexation of the Crimea.74 Russia’s 
instrumentalisation of the drug war narrative 
to both build closer regional and international 
alliances, and to increase its number of 
external bases and training centres, has 
become	a	significant	part	of	the	more	general	
‘great game’ for diplomatic and political 
influence	 being	 fought	 ought	 between	 the	
United States and Russia, both in Central Asia 
and abroad.75 The FSKN has in the process 
become a true ‘power ministry’ less because 
of its abstract purpose, and more due to the 
additional leverage and diplomatic power it 
has come to be seen as granting the Russian 
government, both within the CIS, and on 
the international stage. On the run-up to 
the UNGASS summit of 2016 Russia has 
therefore clearly staked out an increasingly 
far-reaching position on the shaping of future 
global drug policy reform, one whose most 
recent ‘new moralism’ apparently threatens 
to (intentionally) convert the necessary drug 
policy debate that needs to occur into a wider 
(and	artificial)	‘clash	of	civilizations’.	
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